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the Grass Roots: 




This essay provides a rare glimpse of the Space Age at the grass roots of 
American politics and society, in the then ninth-largest city in America in which 
NASA's third-oldest research center is located. It expands recent discussion of 
NASA's "organizational culture" into the wider social, economic, and political 
environments in which NASA necessarily operated. Using local archives, it finds 
that NASA was a technologically innovative organization which was socially 
detached, and thus unable to market itself effectively to local opinion leaders on 
political, economic, or social lines. NASA's attitude towards grassroots com-
munity support closely resembled the "town and gown" separation and socio-
political distance customary in many university and college towns and cities. 
Not until the bells also tolled for NASA's center did its leaders realize that it 
could not prosper while the largest community around it declined. 
NASA as a Socio-Political Institution 
The formative years of the Space Age are generally discussed in terms of 
heroism, high technology, transcendent goals, prestige-based space races, and 
Cold War power politics. Accordingly, we have a great deal of top-down history 
centered in Washington, DC, and especially within the top management of the 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We know much about 
what key leaders (especially presidents) wanted, and about what leading techni-
cal and scientific administrators did and didn't do to achieve varied policies. 
What we know far less about, however, are the nationwide, local, or regional 
socio-political, economic, and cultural contexts in which space exploration ad-
vocates and programs operated.1 
These dynamic and varied contexts were inevitably important. NASA was 
born in an era of universal competition between thermonuclear superpowers 
known as the Cold War. But it was also created as both a civilian and a scientific 
agency. Like the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on which Congress and 
the Eisenhower White House carefully modeled it, NASA was to forward peace-
ful civilian uses of space, just as the AEC involved itself with forwarding nuclear 
electricity generation and the development of therapeutic medical isotopes. This 
meant that NASA was never sui generis. Nor was it ever layered in levels of 
military secrecy like the wartime Manhattan Project, or the military and intelli-
gence agency space-based spy satellite programs.2 
Because NASA was both non-military and public, it inevitably had to oper-
ate in arenas of public understanding and acceptance and political priority-set-
ting. Military or prestige competitions with Communist powers would not 
guarantee the new agency uncomplicated or long-term deference. So NASA 
was advised early and often. Science was harnessed to the growth and power of 
the modern state in very many ways during and after World War II. The 1950s, 
to give but one example, were the decade of the double helix and DNA (and the 
beginnings of the modern era of genetic engineering), as well as the decade of 
Sputnik. NASA was one of scores of major research and development (R&D) 
funding agencies which, combined, would account for one-eighth of total fed-
eral spending by the late 1960s. Therefore, NASA was either going to prove 
itself in terms of new scientific and technological discovery, or it risked losing 
to fields where practical and potential applications (i.e., in areas including medi-
cine) were more immediate, thoroughgoing, and profitable.3 
NASA's civilian status was also a supremely public one. The agency was 
created with a unique requirement to explain what it was doing in the "widest 
practicable and appropriate" ways. It was also supposed to do long range stud-
ies regarding the opportunities and problems involved in the social understand-
ing and utilization of aeronautical and space projects. NASA was not just an 
inward-looking research organization in which engineers designed spacecraft 
for pilots to fly. It was, instead, given responsibilities effecting every aspect of 
the nation's civilian aviation and space programs. It was performing many new 
tasks the federal government had never before undertaken. It had to create on-
going support for those programs in some fashion to prosper.4 
Years later, sociologist William Sims Bainbridge of the National Science 
Foundation nicely summarized NASA's challenge. There were worldly and tran-
scendent motives for spaceflight. The latter allowed small groups of well-placed 
advocates to get lavish funding for specialized projects for brief periods. The 
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former needed—and could enjoy—far more popular support, but would also 
more easily allow for sustained programs. NASA could emphasize transcen-
dent and thoroughly "political" priorities like sending astronauts to the Moon or 
robotic spacecraft to Mars. Such programs, however, were inevitably going to 
be more fragile than, say, weather or communications satellites which made 
clear differences to masses of peoples' daily lives.5 
NASA's mix of transcendent goals and worldly advantages especially mat-
tered because the new agency also existed in a society undergoing important 
and enduring changes in areas as diverse as race relations, gender roles, and 
science-based movements, including modern environmentalism. The America 
of 1957 was a place where state-mandated Apartheid ruled in a third of the 
nation. De facto racisms were common generally. Women scientists, engineers, 
physicians, or managers of any kind were extremely rare. All this was about to 
change. Simultaneously, the explosive growth of suburbs was popularizing public 
health and quality of life debates from specialists concerned with distant wil-
derness areas to far larger groups of people debating issues like malfunctioning 
backyard septic tanks. Space exploration, therefore, never existed in a separate 
socio-political or other universe of its own, though it is rarely written about in 
terms of competing science and technology priorities; or fast changing social 
and occupational roles of racial minorities or women. With the honorable ex-
ception of several recent volumes on the exclusion of women from NASA's 
Astronaut Corps until the late 1970s, however, the first twenty years of NASA's 
existence are generally discussed as if the agency was a special and unique 
place.6 
Scholarly and other treatments, here, mirror NASA's dominant opinion of 
itself. A high-morale, elite, and can-do agency, NASA has generally seen itself 
as an organizational example of what government, in cooperation with private 
industry, can do if unconstrained by competing political, economic, social, or 
scientific claims. With earned pride, however, could go unearned hubris. What 
a high-level panel investigating the loss of a second Space Shuttle in 2003 called 
NASA's "deeply ingrained human spaceflight culture" could "resist external 
pressure for adaptation and change" even when NASA leaders operated on the 
basis of "flawed decision making, self deception, introversion, and diminished 
curiosity" about the world outside the "perfect place" of NASA. These denials 
and avoidances, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board added, were as 
responsible for the Shuttle Columbia's fiery end as were technical failures.7 
NASA Gets Forewarned 
As this paper will show, the flaws, introversions, and self-deceptions iden-
tified and discussed by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board of 2003 
have long existed at NASA. They also have had broader socio-political compo-
nents; ones which have strongly effected the public profile of and attention paid 
to the space agency from its earliest beginnings in 1958. 
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NASA's internal "organizational culture" is the subject of recent books. 
This essay expands that discussion to the wider social, economic, and political 
environments in which NASA operated. NASA was a new agency doing some-
thing government never had done before. No popular constituencies existed 
regarding the peaceful exploration or development of outer space. Science fic-
tion novels had promoted imaginary and unbudgeted ideas of human space-
flight. But this did not prove or guarantee ongoing public or political support 
for the realities of expensive NASA programs. In the years immediately after 
the Sputniks orbited, moreover, the vast majority of adult Americans knew as 
little about the realities of space as they understood about other alien realities at 
the bottom of the world's oceans.8 
In February of 1961, NASA hired a Harvard Business School-based 
consultancy to gauge levels of understanding and support for space efforts among 
college-educated professionals. The report arrived at NASA three months be-
fore John F. Kennedy proposed to base America's prestige on an Apollo lunar 
landing by 1970. Nobody, said the consultants, was against NASA—yet. But its 
budgets were doubling every year, and very soon, NASA would spend one-third 
of what the Defense Department spent. Centers of interest group opposition 
would then inevitably arise. If NASA wanted far more visible and expensive 
space explorations to remain a political priority, it could presume it was a mili-
tary-essenced agency on a presidential—or other—"mission" in which civilians 
were not involved. Or it could presume that educated opinion-maker profes-
sionals, then composing about 10 percent of all adults, were an important con-
stituency that could influence Congress and the wider society alike. Journalism 
of the national loin-girdling sort was not going to create a secure future for 
NASA. Such press coverage rhetorically equated a huge and diverse nation 
with a single mass mind which had somehow determined to win universal space 
races with the Russians in the aftermath of Russia's first earth satellites and 
lunar probes. But such editorial hyperbole and high-flown news media cover-
age was not the scope or scale of popular attitudes. Even if public opinion was 
defined only as those with four-year college degrees, popular knowledge about 
peaceful uses of space was limited—both before and after Sputnik. Space ex-
ploration was vaguely glamorous; but few lawyers and closed system ecologists 
polled at length by the consultancy had given sustained attention to anything 
NASA did immediately before President John F. Kennedy put his political capi-
tal behind a space race to land astronauts on the Moon's surface by 1970. After 
three years of sustained print and electronic media coverage, few lawyers knew 
that NASA existed or what it did and few better informed scientific specialists 
had anything but a "disinterested and dubious attitude toward the scientific va-
lidity of the [manned] space effort."9 
Media-based mass or elite mobilization, in short, had not happened. NASA 
had not risen above "background noise" in public awareness or discourse. Tele-
vision coverage, in particular, had not—and did not—sell space politically for 
NASA. Later arguments that NASA's manned space program's relation to 
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America's advertising industry "resembled that of a guest conductor to a resi-
dent symphony orchestra" presumed NASA had ambitious, targeted, and long-
term political marketing strategies. What NASA's Public Affairs Office press 
handlers had, instead, was a very high rate of turnover (five public affairs chiefs 
at NASA headquarters in the 1,000 days of the Kennedy administration) and, 
after that, a head manager who never did any media or public opinion research 
at all during his decade long Apollo Era tenure, while believing newspeople 
"could interpret events almost at will and hold sway over millions of television 
viewers for better or worse as far as NASA was concerned."10 
NASA as a Decentralized Agency 
Just because key political managers at NASA headquarters in Washington 
had simplistic ideas about building secure bases of political support for their 
new agency early in the Space Age did not necessarily mean the same would be 
true of NASA as a whole, however. NASA and the 8,000-person-strong aero-
nautical and aerospace research agency which had preceded it, the National 
Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, were decentralized organizations. This 
was convenient, because space was a place, not a program, and NASA, accord-
ingly, speedily became a coalition of interests ranging from aviation to astro-
nautics to astronomy. Most of NASA's varied work was done in what soon became 
twelve research centers around the country. Each center had different project 
responsibilities and technical specialties; and their relationships to each other 
resembled those of the high status branches of a major state university system. 
(Berkeley and UCLA were both part of the same University of California sys-
tem. But both flagship campuses competed as well as cooperated, and pos-
sessed local traditions and loyalties.) 
Components of NASA's fast-growing federalized bureaucratic system, there-
fore, could experiment in more than science and engineering. The new NASA 
centers of the 1960s could join the already-established ones as laboratories for 
innovation regarding NASA's legislatively required duty to explain its new ac-
tivities in the "widest practicable" ways. One clear benefit of such activity could 
be discovering ways to gain support among important opinion-making groups 
for ambitious, expensive, and ongoing space programs in which they were espe-
cially involved. 
Three of NASA's oldest labs, additionally, were advantageously sited to do 
this work in or near major cities. NASA-Ames was at Mofifett Field just south of 
San Francisco; the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena was near Los Ange-
les; while NASA-Lewis (now NASA-Glenn) was located at the up-to-date mu-
nicipal airport in Cleveland, the ninth largest city in America when the Space 
Age began. NASA-Lewis, like NASA-Ames and NASA-Langley near Wash-
ington, moreover, were well-established aviation research labs, well positioned 
to attract public attention to civil aerospace. This was especially important be-
cause the 1950s and 1960s were massive growth years for civilian passenger 
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aviation. Only 1 in 4 American adults had ever experienced flight in 1960. Half 
the adults in the top quarter of family income had flown, to only one-fifth in the 
bottom three income quarters. Flight was still for the wealthy, or the military. 
By 1970, however, one-half of all adults had flown; and, by 1990, three-fourths. 
Travel for those affluent enough to do it increasingly meant going to airports, 
not bus or train stations, or ports full of trans-oceanic liners. As Apollo space-
craft were being built so were revolutionary designs like the Boeing 747 jetliner 
(flight-tested as Apollo 8 circled the Moon).11 
The aviation portion of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's 
work, then, very clearly involved Earthly advantages for citizens and taxpayers 
who might care little for lunar prestige-races, the possibility of life on Mars, or 
the structure, composition, or age of the universe. Cleveland's leaders, addi-
tionally, had important worldly economic reasons to concern themselves with 
high-tech aerospace development; and they possessed, as we shall see, unusu-
ally good personal connections to NASA. Despite such advantages and inter-
ests, however, NASA's experience in Cleveland from the 1950s to the end of the 
1970s was a case study in how not to expand local support for an agency. 
NASA in Cleveland 
"Rust-belt" Cleveland, Ohio, and NASA may at first seem a curious asso-
ciation. But stereotypes deceive. The Wright Brothers were Ohioans. Cleveland 
investors started making the city an aviation center in 1920. From 1929 to 1949, 
Cleveland hosted the National Air Races. Connections to a premier aviation 
event paid off in 1940. As the Roosevelt administration mobilized for war, a 
federal aviation research lab that later became NASA's third-oldest facility was 
built at Cleveland's new airport, eight miles from the city center. By 1961, the 
NASA-Lewis lab employed 3,000. Aerospace, clearly, paid.12 
Few understood this better than the political manager who created NASA. 
T. Keith Glennan ran a technical university in Cleveland for ten years before 
spending two and a half years as NASA's first Administrator. When Glennan 
returned to what became Case Western Reserve University as president in 1961, 
he brought with him a determination to transform Cleveland into a high-tech-
nology center. He increased graduate students ten-fold; faculty by 60%; and 
opened all science and engineering classes to women a decade before most 
other technical schools. Raising huge amounts of money and building fast, 
Glennan wanted the "University Circle" area around his campus to become "one 
of the world's major research centers." Glennan's school also reached-out over 
color lines. In 1964, Case awarded a doctorate in Physics to Dr. Dudley 
McConnell, an aerospace engineer, who became NASA's only high-ranking 
African-American scientific or technical official in the following decade. By 
1965, Science magazine, Saturday Review, and others, had noticed such ef-
forts.13 
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Meanwhile, at the NASA-Lewis lab, Dr. Abe Silverstein was newly in-
charge, after spending two years away from Cleveland in Washington as a key 
Glennan aide responsible for overseeing both manned and unmanned space flight 
at NASA headquarters. Given such important local NASA connections, Cleve-
land journalists saw aerospace as a key factor in the economic future of city and 
region. 
The interest of local journalists was illustrated by Louis B. Seltzer's 
editorship of the Cleveland Press, the flagship of the Scripps-Howard newspa-
per chain. The Press had employed—very unusually—an "aviation reporter" 
since 1940. The day after Sputnik, this journalistic specialist clearly explained 
how experts meeting at Lewis would analyze the "red satellite." Such local in-
terest, activity, and involvement were a Seltzer trademark. Seltzer had a na-
tional repute as "Mr. Cleveland" from Life magazine, CBS reporter Edward R. 
Murrow, Saturday Review, and others. He was networked into the city's neigh-
borhoods and was a political kingmaker. Democratic mayors, governors, U.S. 
Senators, and several members of President Kennedy's Cabinet owed him 
favors.14 
Seltzer's longtime enthusiasm about aviation also quickly became enthusi-
asm about aerospace. Sputnik, he told Scouting Magazine in 1958, was a wake-
up call. It would increase levels of "patriotic obligation." To fulfill Seltzer's 
obligation, "Mr. Cleveland" ran supportive editorials, human-interest profiles 
of local NASA staff, and front-page stories about local accomplishments such 
as the first Mercury test capsules built by Lewis. All this activity mixed pragma-
tism and patriotism. NASA-Lewis grew from 3,000 to almost 5,000 employees 
in the several years after 1961, becoming one of Cleveland's largest employers. 
Seltzer knew Cleveland's traditional heavy manufacturing base of steel and auto 
manufacturing was starting to contract. NASA jobs, however, were the high-
tech future. Helping to achieve that future was intelligent selfishness. For with-
out good jobs, people didn't buy newspapers.15 
Journalistic Mass Mobilization Begins 
Seltzer's mix of self-interest and community service regarding NASA 
only intensified after Keith Glennan returned to Cleveland after service as 
NASA's first Administrator in March of 1961. The very next month, Case's 
reinstated president hosted "the most complete exhibition of space vehicles ever 
assembled under one roof." The presentation consisted of 14 full-scale models 
of early NASA satellites circling a suspended eight-foot globe circled by multi-
colored aluminum tubing illustrated the orbits of all America's then-46 satel-
lites. Twelve and a half thousand people went through the exhibit in two weeks; 
Case Western's exhibit was covered in 162 local and national news stories— 
making this "one of the more broadly publicized events of the year" at the school. 
Others quickly realized that if Glennan could get a display that also visited 
Washington, Montreal, and Chicago to Cleveland, he and Silverstein might also 
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help advertise NASA and Cleveland (and the Cleveland Press) with a bigger 
show with full-sized rockets and space capsules at Lewis' 300-acre grounds.16 
NASA-Lewis, after all, was hardly flush with visitors. In 1959, the lab, 
which did significant amounts of classified military work, "cleared" only 4,994 
visitors. Since 1942,3,000 to 5,000 guests a year—10 to 14 people every day— 
visited Lewis. This was at a time when Cleveland's population was 900,000 and 
Ohio's population grew from 7 to 10 million. Included in this small number of 
visitors were civilian scientists using Lewis's state of the art supersonic wind 
tunnels or then-rare room-sized Uni vac computers.17 
Louis Seltzer knew NASA could do far better than this. So, in 1961 and 
early 1962, he sparkplugged a twentieth anniversary celebration aimed at bringing 
25,000 people to Lewis on a single weekend. 
The "Youth Days" celebration that the Cleveland Press and NASA-Lewis 
co-sponsored on August 5 and 6,1962, was unprecedented. Though America's 
first astronauts had just gotten into orbit, no NASA facility was tourist-friendly 
in 1962. The Cape Canaveral launch site in Florida, for example, did not open 
the first NASA Visitor Center until 1967. Not until December of 1963 could 
visitors at the Cape even drive through a distant part of the mostly-military 
facility in their cars on Saturday and Sunday afternoons only . . . without stop-
ping. NASA-sold souvenirs, such as postcards or T-shirts, were unknown in 
1962—and for almost a decade afterwards. As the first astronauts reached the 
Moon's surface in July 1969, NASA headquarters tried—and failed—to stop 
sales of Apollo 11 mission patches of an American eagle delivering a wreath of 
olive branches to lunar soil. NASA, in 1962, barely tolerated reporters, never 
mind the public for whom those journalists wrote.18 
Unprecedented or not, Youth Days of 1962 were successful. 17,000 of the 
hoped for 25,000 people showed up. This in a summer school vacation season 
when boys and girls were often harder to locate, and less likely to be studious. 
Their average age was fifteen; three-quarters of whom were male. Cameras, 
high heels, and smoking were all prohibited. The Cleveland Press distributed 
free tickets, arranged free transportation, and headlined NASA exhibits, which 
included an eight-story high Redstone rocket and mock-ups of Mercury and 
Apollo spacecraft. Here was exactly the community outreach and education 
effort that premier aerospace industry trade journal Aviation Week and Space 
Technology had just advised NASA it needed to increase public awareness and 
gain greater political support in Congress. NASA headquarters sent observers. 
Life, Look, and Time magazines sent reporters. Other cities asked Seltzer about 
creating Youth Days of their own. NASA-Lewis had just had three and one-half 
times as many visitors in two days as it had in any of the twenty years since its 
creation.19 
Things weren't over yet. The Press was a Democratic paper. Its Republican 
competitor, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, wasn't amused. The Plain Dealer's 
ferociously competitive editor, Thomas H. Vail, soon put on a NASA gala of his 
own. What Seltzer co-sponsored out at Cleveland's airport and Lewis lab, Vail 
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and the "PD" did in the city's largest downtown hall: Cleveland Public Audito-
rium. Its 80 foot-high ceilings allowed everything from an X-15 rocket plane to 
Saturn 5 rocket engines to be exhibited. For ten days from November 23 to 
December 2, 1962, during the prime post-Thanksgiving shopping season, the 
Plain Dealer/N AS A-Lewis "Space Science Fair" was a big show for Cleveland 
and the surrounding region—twice as large as an exhibit NASA had just put on 
for the Seattle World's Fair. The Plain Dealer estimated that over 300,000 people 
attended, including about 50,000 students, plus 15,000 employees and their 
guests from TRW, Cleveland's biggest aerospace employer. 
Vail's "Space Science Fair" was as well organized and marketed as Seltzer's. 
The Plain Dealer advertised the event for a month, averaging two space stories 
a day. The paper paid for special premieres, dinners, and talks for local educa-
tors. Deluxe treatment was reserved for 1,000 people in tuxedoes and minks in 
the main ballroom of Cleveland's most luxurious hotel. NASA's initials were 
carved into four-foot high, 400-pound blocks of ice as a centerpiece. A press 
office was created for visiting print and electronic journalists. 
Vail thought big. NASA Administrator James Webb and ex-Administrator 
Glennan officially co-sponsored the event. So did both of Ohio's Senators, five 
Congresspeople (three Democrats and two Republicans—one of whom was a 
woman), two of Cleveland's most-powerful ex-mayors, the heads of the city's 
Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO, and others. NASA, the Air Force, aero-
space companies, and local universities helped with "technical hosts," demon-
strations, exhibits, and special instructors for 17,000 gifted science students. 
Twice in five months, as the Apollo and the manned Mercury programs began, 
NASA had just put on the most ambitious, organized, and successful exhibi-
tions it had ever attempted. Cleveland seemed poised to be a model for the 
future of popular education and mobilization by NASA.20 
As a result: No repeat of a Youth Days co-sponsored by the Cleveland 
Press ever happened at Lewis. The Plain Dealer also never repeated its "Space 
Science Fair." When NASA-Lewis celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary a year 
early in 1966, lab director Abe Silverstein limited guests to 2,000 "top execu-
tives from across the country." "Congressmen, educators, and businessmen" 
listened to NASA's Administrator James Webb and viewed a Gemini spacecraft 
recently returned from orbit—and from the New York World's Fair of 1965, an 
exposition NASA almost didn't attend at all. None of NASA-Lewis's 1966 cel-
ebration had any local focus or concern. The Cleveland Press ignored the occa-
sion. The Plain Dealer barely mentioned it. What had happened? How had a 
model of press-orchestrated community mobilization in Cleveland gone awry?21 
What Went Wrong? 
Some aspects of the answer involved NASA; others, Cleveland itself. On 
the NASA side, the Press and Plain Dealer events of 1962 put NASA-Lewis in-
touch with 3,000 science teachers in a seven-state region of the Midwest includ-
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ing Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis. The lab seems to have limited its out-
reach efforts to these teachers—and to (non-Cleveland) high schools—for al-
most fifteen years after 1962. This science educator centered effort complemented 
Abe Silverstein's views of Lewis as an R&D campus and advertised NASA to 
engineering students of particular interest as later potential employees. Said 
one person who worked for him as public affairs head during his 1960-1969 
tenure as lab director, Silverstein would "do a few goodwill things." Then, how-
ever, Silverstein wanted Lewis left alone. So much so that Lewis did not be-
come the last (of twelve) NASA facilities to hire an outside contractor to open 
and operate a Visitors Center (instead of requiring visitors to be pre-approved 
as individuals or small groups several weeks in-advance) until 1976, twenty 
years after Sputnik. Silverstein served on the boards of three local universities. 
According to his wife, he also socialized mainly with NASA and university 
people. But he did not realize, as fellow NASA center director William L. 
Pickering of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory quipped in 1960, that the future may 
belong to the youth, but the "present is the property of the middle-aged."22 
Another thing Silverstein forgot and Pickering didn't was that the general 
public normally had never set foot on a college campus or the grounds of a 
NASA lab. These people paid the bills for exploring space as taxpayers, but, as 
Pickering put it, "Like any good budget manager, the taxpayer is ultimately 
going to revolt against paying a rather large bill for something he really doesn't 
understand."23 
The apparent lack of strong personal or institutional ties between Glennan 
and Silverstein illustrated these wider problems. The two men had worked to-
gether for two and a half years in Washington creating NASA. Back home in 
Cleveland, their institutions clearly needed one another. Hundreds of NASA-
Lewis people, for example, received advanced science and engineering degrees 
at what became Glennan's Case Western in the 1960s. Case faculty had also 
started putting together research proposals for NASA evaluation and possible 
funding at Glennan's request as early as 1958. For all this, however, Glennan 
and Silverstein weren't close. Glennan, for instance, could write to a friend two 
years after he and Silverstein both returned to Cleveland, "I see Abe Silverstein 
once in a while and we hope to be doing some research projects under the spon-
sorship of the Lewis Research Center."24 
Informality and vague hopes after two years was not the energetic local 
cooperation and creation of concrete benefits which could help sell NASA's 
programs to groups including Cleveland's businesspeople. And that was what 
second NASA Administrator James Webb was telling NASA's laboratory heads 
that he wanted in 1962 and 1963. Nor did Silverstein's lack of interest in co-
operation with Case help Glennan's efforts at academic entrepreneurship. 
Glennan wanted large awards of NASA money for things like an in-house com-
puter-development and electronic research lab in this period. Glennan also clearly 
tried to maximize the benefits Case received from his earlier NASA associa-
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tions. But his success was spotty, at best. It was not until May of 1965, for 
example, that a retiring Glennan finalized a $2.6 million NASA grant for a 
space science building at Case named after him. This single award almost doubled 
the amount Case had received from NASA since 1959. Given that NASA's bud-
get peaked, in purchasing power terms, at just over $5 billion in 1965 dollars 
during that same year, Case's 1959-1965 total of about $5 million was a small 
fraction of what better-known technical schools like MIT got from NASA in a 
single year.25 
One reason why Case lagged might have involved an apparent lack of per-
sonal respect or chemistry between Glennan and Silverstein. Silverstein received 
an honorary PhD from Glennan's Case in 1958. But he waited to become a Case 
trustee until 1965, the same year Glennan departed. No note or letter from 
Silverstein to Glennan, meanwhile, exists in key files in Glennan's personal or 
university papers; while Glennan's few remaining letters to Silverstein demon-
strate no personal familiarity. As one result of this social distance, Silverstein 
didn't formally request aid from NASA headquarters regarding a small $30,000 
effort to offer summer workshops for engineering professors in conjunction with 
Case until February 1963. This American Society of Engineering-initiated project 
also didn't get funded in 1963, went awry somehow in 1964, and only seems to 
have succeeded in 1965. Case Western academics, meanwhile, applied for NASA 
money a total of fifty-one times from 1959 to 1964. The "yield-rate" of dollars-
requested to dollars-received for the school was 38%—or just over $2 million 
over five years. An average of $400,000 per annum did not appear to demon-
strate any patterns of ambitious cooperation between Cleveland's long-estab-
lished technical university and its also long-established NASA lab. The Ford 
Foundation put Case ($8 million) in the same league as Stanford ($25 million) 
and MIT (over $9 million) in terms of the higher educational funding it awarded 
by 1960. NASA, however, seems to have acted otherwise. Not until January of 
1964 did Case's chief academic officer receive a letter from NASA-Lewis's 
assistant director saying, "Case would be a logical organization to serve as an 
interface between aerospace technology [research and development programs] 
and industry" in and around Cleveland.26 
Abe Silverstein's papers, meanwhile, remain mute. They sit at a new one-
person archival office at NASA-Lewis/Glenn awaiting lengthy processing. But 
Silverstein's apparent inattention to cooperation with a premier local and re-
gional technical university was part of wider patterns. NASA-Lewis did very 
little to advertise what it did to the hundreds of thousands who passed through 
the fast-growing municipal airport right next door every year in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. In the 1970s, Cleveland's city schools even created an Aviation 
High School named after Benjamin O. Davis, the first African-American gen-
eral in the U.S. Army. This aviation high school limped along for ten years, and 
may or may not have benefited from any assistance by NASA personnel. Both 
the Cleveland Press archives and spot-checks of the NASA-Lewis newsletter of 
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the period, however, show no human or financial links on the NASA side of the 
equation.27 
The Politics of Race 
NASA-Lewis's curious distance from the city of Cleveland only increased 
with the major and still-ongoing political and social changes which commenced 
in Cleveland in 1964. At issue was race: the major and defining domestic issue 
of America in the 1960s. Cleveland's first civil rights protests began with Afri-
can Americans picketing the city's School Board and White protestors counter-
marching through Black neighborhoods. African Americans had tripled from 1 
in 12 to 1 in 4 of Cleveland's population between 1940 and 1960. Internal im-
migrants joined foreign immigrants looking for entry-level jobs in Cleveland's 
relatively-large manufacturing sector, which supplied half the city's jobs until 
the 1950s. Once a subsequent 30-year slide in industries like steel and auto 
began, however, the political economy of dividing gains was replaced with the 
politics and economics of apportioning losses. New arrivals from Alabama and 
Slovenia now fought over diminishing jobs. Schooling, housing, and other de-
bates soon intermingled with such struggles.28 
Cleveland's power structure ignored such raw and unsettling racial reali-
ties in a civil rights era for as long as they could. Cleveland was segregated by 
custom, not law. Most recent foreign immigrants lived apart from each other, as 
well as Blacks. Older-stock Whites, meanwhile, tended towards bland denials. 
They also lived apart in older "streetcar suburbs" which hemmed-in Cleveland 
itself. Keith Glennan's Case Western Reserve University, only four miles east 
of the city's center, sat on—and across—one such boundary between an in-
creasingly-Black city and then almost completely-White suburbs. 
White suburb dweller Keith Glennan understood earlier and more clearly 
than most that continued denial wouldn't work. He had created massive multi-
million dollar capital improvements including hospitals, labs, and dormitories 
at Case Western which were difficult or impossible to relocate. He also knew 
what disturbance and fear could do to his school's reputation. Glennan began 
efforts to stabilize and improve the socio-economic makeup of the areas near 
Case's campus. He also used the occasion of his retirement as Case Western's 
president in June of 1965 to tell Cleveland's leaders that the good old days were 
over. African Americans were a "new center of power and influence in the com-
munity." Old "compartmentalizing" ethnic politics strategies that played groups 
off against each other wouldn't work much longer. New class and racial groups 
had to be involved in solving city problems.29 
Louis B. Seltzer and the Cleveland Press loved it. "He took the town's 
measure," an editorial lauding Glennan's speech said, "He pointed his finger 
accurately." Glennan's final address to a city where he'd spent fifteen busy and 
productive years was frank good sense. Thomas Vail's Plain Dealer agreed, 
"camouflaging" urban problems wouldn't work. Two very high profile opinion-
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shapers and reporters—one Republican and the other Democrat—agreed that 
Cleveland's leaders and the city's key institutions had to address changing po-
litical realities in their own and the city's better interests. Denial and avoidance 
were both insufficient and vain.30 
As if to demonstrate the often unwelcome truths the city's premier journal-
ists reported, just over a year after Glennan spoke, six days of rioting began in 
Cleveland after an inter-racial dispute in a bar. The National Guard was called 
out after four deaths, thirty injuries, 300 arrests, and 240 fires. All saloons were 
closed for several days to assist sober reflection. One year later, Cleveland be-
came the first big city in America to elect an African-American mayor, Demo-
crat Carl Stokes. Levels of racial tension directly affected levels of editorial 
support for NASA programs in the Cleveland Press from 1963 until 1967.31 
What was happening meanwhile out at NASA-Lewis, 8 miles west of 
Cleveland's city hall? Abe Silverstein was a civil servant who thought of his 
center as an R&D campus. But unlike fellow campus manager Keith Glennan, 
he avoided any high-profile involvement in Cleveland's problems. NASA-Lewis 
opted for separation. Institutional self-segregation was relatively easy on three 
counts: Economically, Lewis spent as much as two-thirds of its 1960s budgets 
on subcontracts with already-established aerospace companies in places like 
southern California instead of becoming a major engine of local high-tech eco-
nomic growth. Geographically, NASA-Lewis was located on the very tip of a 
long finger of the city. It was also ringed by affluent white suburbs with names 
like Lakewood, Rocky River, Fairview Park, North Olmstead, and Berea. Psy-
chologically, eight miles could be 800. NASA, finally, was a technical agency. 
It had the lowest percentage of racial minorities and women employed of any 
federal agency as late as the 1970s. Its facilities were located mostly in the 
South. Its leaders were at least as prone to elite denial as universities, gentlemen's 
clubs, professional organizations, and other self-consciously intellectual orga-
nizations of the period. When problems didn't have technical solutions, it ap-
parently simply didn't know what to do. Even in its own best interest; even as 
laws requiring race and gender diversity came into existence; and even as Cleve-
land, together with Chicago and Detroit, became one of the three most residen-
tially segregated cities in America.32 
The Effects of Self-Segregation 
How little community coverage of NASA-Lewis exists in the Cleveland 
Press archives after the abortive space galas of 1962 provides one clear indica-
tor of how quickly NASA ceased being a prominent part of public notice and 
discussion in the city in which its third-oldest aviation and rocketry lab was 
located. NASA hired an African-American lecturer as part of its suburban 
schools-based education effort by 1965. But otherwise, individuals acted with-
out institutional support regarding community outreach. In 1960, for instance, 
seven African-American engineers and chemists at Lewis got together semi-
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formally to talk about promising scientific and technical careers to Black teen-
agers and parents on the city's largely-Black East Side, where all seven NASA 
men lived.33 
These seven African Americans lived sometimes inconveniently far from 
their work rather than in surrounding west side Cleveland communities because 
non-white NASA employees "had difficulty finding housing" there, a NASA 
"Chief of the liquid metals branch" told a Plain Dealer reporter four and a half 
years later in July of 1964. Dr. Louis Rosenblum was trying to get his 4,800 
colleagues at NASA-Lewis to sign cards pledging themselves to "support the 
right of any law-abiding and responsible person of whatever race, religion, or 
national origin to move into my neighborhood" and to work to maintain "a 
community which is good for all." The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawing dis-
crimination in public accommodations and employment had just become law 
two weeks before, and an ecumenical religious effort was underway in Cleve-
land to end housing segregation voluntarily. Two hundred of NASA's 4,800 
employees offered to help distribute these pledge-cards. What—if anything— 
the other 4,600 did is unknown.34 
It is unlikely that a vast majority of NASA's employees extended them-
selves very much to expand the coverage of civil rights laws. For, in 1967, 
Lewis was blasted in an internal NASA report for its lack of community con-
nection or concern. 1967 was an important year for NASA. Two flat budgets 
were followed by one in which it took an unprecedented 10% decrease. Promi-
nent Democrats in Congress had charged NASA's leadership with a cover-up of 
safety problems with the Apollo spacecraft following the deaths of three Apollo 
astronauts in a launch simulation training exercise in January. In July, NASA's 
formal opening of its first Visitor Center at Cape Kennedy demonstrated head-
quarters finally was beginning to understand the need for greatly increased popu-
lar access and regard a decade after the Space Age began. In October of 1967, 
significantly, NASA headquarters' first survey of visitor policies at all NASA 
facilities was also completed. The report's author, Brain Duff, later headed 
NASA's Public Affairs program. He was no malcontent. Neither, however, was 
Duff an apologist for those within NASA who still believed the agency could or 
should exist without greater public exposure, understanding, and support. Newer 
NASA centers, he concluded, were starting to get concerned about general pub-
lic access, as opposed to "VVIP [Very very important person], technical, and 
special interest groups." But older, aviation-concerned, NASA labs like Lewis, 
Ames (San Francisco), and Langley in Virginia were resisting. They " . . . have 
hung out signs saying 'Do not disturb—(but keep sending money),'" Duff ac-
idly but accurately concluded.35 
Such socio-political avoidance, Duff continued, only insured that: "Some 
centers have used the ostrich approach even more effectively than the ostrich. 
After generations in the communities, they really have achieved near invisibil-
ity."36 
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NASA's two big city-based aviation centers insured their obscurity even in 
a passenger aviation era which gave tens of millions of Americans their first 
experience of flight. Ironies abounded. Lewis, actually, spent three times as 
much money security inspecting handfuls of visitors after 1967 as the Kennedy 
Space Center spent busing thousands along sixty miles of bus routes. The Ames 
Center near San Francisco was more restrictive than he Navy base surrounding 
it about allowing tourists to do things like take photographs. "Only VIPs [very 
important people] and technical groups" were encouraged to visit Lewis, Duff 
observed. "Turndowns" to others were "acknowledged to be high." "We could 
run a tour program," Duff quoted one "restive staff center man" at a place like 
Lewis as saying, "with energy we spend now just trying to keep people away."37 
Given, however, that a decentralized NASA also still had no overall visitor 
policy agency-wide ten years after Sputnik, it is also not surprising that Duff's 
criticisms about Lewis's self-defeating segregation from the world around it 
accomplished nothing. Nor is it surprising that the Press archives then remained 
silent about NASA-Lewis and any community issue connected with race for the 
thirteen years from 1964 to 1977.38 
The End of Avoidance 
Avoidance about racial matters at NASA-Lewis and elsewhere within NASA 
continued until NASA headquarters in Washington got in very high profile trouble 
regarding institutionalized racism and sexism during the climax of the Watergate 
Crisis. It fired its highest-ranking Black female for pointing out the agency's 
unconcern with minority or female hiring and technical training in October 1973. 
NASA's timing was awful. This was the same month that Richard Nixon sacked 
the first Special Prosecutor in the Watergate case and made political crisis per-
petual for the remainder of his presidency. An Affirmative Action era in em-
ployment was underway. The nation's capital was moving from half to two-thirds 
African-American. Many of those African Americans worked for the area's largest 
employer: the federal government. Washington was a southern town and NASA 
a mostly-southern based agency. So, after threats from three Senate commit-
tees, protests from numerous organizations, and a legal appeal from the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, NASA reluctantly rehired the woman who had pointed out 
NASA's imperfections ten months after her firing, and just as Nixon resigned 
his office. Neither what the Washington Post called NASA's "simple pieties" 
nor its "eloquent declarations of principle" was sufficient any more. NASA had 
to stop talking and start doing. Specifically, it had to apply civil rights laws to 
employment in the 1970s to avoid a reprise of the riots of the 1960s, just like 
any other institution in American society. By 1978, longtime exclusions of fe-
males and Blacks were even slowly and reluctantly ending in a hitherto all-
white and all-male astronaut corps. NASA was being forced to open-up to new 
social constituencies—just like the society around it.39 
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Simultaneously, NASA-Lewis began to end its effort to ignore the soon-to-
be half-Black city of which it was a part. Opening a Visitor Center in 1976 and 
creating a Speaker's Bureau that same year were part of this belated opening-up 
process. In the fall of 1977, NASA-Lewis apparently also gave its first organi-
zational support for Cleveland's city schools since it had funded a mathematics 
program at a single technical high school in the early 1960s. Two staff mem-
bers, one a recently-arrived African-American Physics PhD from the University 
of Michigan, received $45,000 in seed money to create a science and engineer-
ing career-preparation program in two schools in African-American and mixed 
neighborhoods. Funding was initially for one year only and involved only 120 
students. But it was nevertheless the start of a long-delayed recognition that 
NASA-Lewis couldn't thrive while the community around it died, any more 
than could Keith Glennan's Case Western Reserve University.40 
Just in case anyone at Lewis wondered, rumors started circulating that NASA 
was going to close Lewis and several other labs to save money as NASA bud-
gets fell to half of their Apollo Era peak. Suddenly, Cleveland's NASA Lab 
became far more devoted to local public relations and public outreach. 
As an indicator, NASA-Lewis seems to have tried another "open house" in 
1973 that attracted very few. But its effort in 1981 drew just over 10,000 visi-
tors in two days. It was fortunate that people came in 1981, for rumors were 
especially persistent and widespread then that Lewis and other NASA labs and 
programs were going to be discontinued by Reagan budget-cutters. Lewis's 
workforce numbers, meanwhile, had sagged to between 2,600 and 2,700. This 
was slightly below the 3,000 it had had before Apollo began in 1961. Suddenly 
Lewis opened a souvenir shop, and got rid of the last vestiges of "clearances" 
for individuals or families. Tourist groups, however, still had to apply 2-3 weeks 
in advance and organizations wanting speakers, 8-10 weeks in advance. From 
1981 onwards, Lewis' status within NASA has remained tenuous enough that 
the lab protectively renamed itself NASA-Glenn (after first U.S. orbital astro-
naut, John Glenn of Ohio) in 1998, just after NASA orbited a then-77 year old 
Glenn in the Space Shuttle. Finally, after keeping the public mostly at bay for 
the first twenty-five years of the Space Age, NASA-Lewis/Glenn ironically be-
came the leading NASA laboratory for public education in the 1990's, and be-
gan performing that role capably.41 
Public support is now, clearly, a basic element of NASA-Glenn's survival. 
This is particularly true because NASA's current aviation budget is once again 
shrinking after a goals-rich and funding-poor Moon-Mars initiative introduced 
by President George Bush in 2003 in the wake of the loss of a second U.S. 
Space Shuttle. NASA-Glenn will survive. It remains NASA's only center out-
side of the South and West. It has historic strengths in developing new propul-
sion systems NASA will need to get its Mars exploration efforts economically 
underway. NASA, however, is also learning many socio-political lessons late. 
This occurred because NASA's early leaders often all too successfully defined 
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themselves in sui generis terms: as brilliant engineers providing cutting edge 
hardware for "right stuff' pilots to take into orbit or beyond. 
NASA was always more than this, and inevitably so. But so long as Cold 
War missions obscured other earthly exploration or science goals, NASA's domi-
nant engineering and piloting culture could and did see spaceflight in self-justi-
fying terms. In such mindsets, paying attention to any sort of public opinion 
could seem analogous to asking a class of high school science students what 
they felt about gravity. 
Archival and other data used in this research, accordingly, provides little 
evidence for the successful mobilization of grass-roots political support by NASA 
in Cleveland during the first 25 years of the Space Age. NASA-Lewis talked to 
already-interested engineering and science specialists. Otherwise, it seems to 
have basically ignored its political, economic, educational, and social surround-
ings for over two decades after Sputnik, until it belatedly went public to sur-
vive. As one ironic result, an aviation research laboratory next to a major airport 
benefited little from the 1960s and 1970s jet airline travel revolution that changed 
America. NASA-Lewis did not care that Cleveland withered or died . . . until 
bells also tolled for it. The only local "public" it seems to have had were subur-
ban science teachers, interested students, a scattering of local academics and an 
unknown number of professional people, corporate leaders, and the general 
public. NASA mostly talked to itself, and addressed the already-enthusiastic. 
What NASA-Lewis did, NASA headquarters also did. Not until 1976— 
after civil rights embarrassments, plummeting budgets, and fast-fading political 
support in Congress, and as NASA-Lewis became the last NASA lab to open a 
visitor center, did NASA sponsor another study in connection with a bicenten-
nial effort to create more public engagement with space-based activity between 
1980 and 2000. In 1961, NASA's first—and for the next fifteen years, o n l y -
such analysis had been buried. This time, a military-industrial think-tank known 
as the Hudson Institute largely repeated the utterly-forgotten message of the 
earlier-mentioned Harvard Business School-based consultants of 1961. NASA, 
for instance, should take special care to link up with national, state, and local 
professional constituencies—like aviators—who identified with specific NASA 
programs. Twenty years—a full human generation—after Sputnik, NASA was 
very reluctantly re-learning lessons it could have learned—in Cleveland, as else-
where—in 1961 and 1962.42 
The Ongoing Influence of Illusion 
None of this reluctance is accidental. Official histories of NASA labs pro-
duced before the 1990s normally said nothing about the communities in which 
those labs were located. Nor did they refer to wider social movements such as 
the movement of millions of women and minorities into hitherto-closed por-
tions of America's labor force. A "town and gown" mindset was evident. NASA 
was a beloved alma mater and a special and elite institution. On its research and 
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development campuses, unique and eternal truths were discovered and tran-
scendent purposes achieved. Lesser matters of society, politics, or economics 
did not enter in. The social history of the space age at the grass roots, accord-
ingly, was non-existent.43 
Lacking much in the way of external reality-checks, NASA's ideas about 
the degrees of public support that it did—or did not—enjoy stayed largely an-
ecdotal, miscellaneous, or illusory. NASA talked, but it rarely listened. It still 
had a social research function written into the legislation establishing it which it 
still normally ignored. Early assumptions that widespread live television cover-
age of early Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo missions would change the world-
views of millions of Americans were still unaccompanied with any effort to 
determine what opinion effects TV (or other press) coverage was actually hav-
ing at any point during NASA's formative decades. A science and technology-
based agency was still reluctant to apply very-basic scientific principles to itself. 
Anecdote still substituted. It still too-often does. Advocates can, for instance, 
look to Hollywood space epics or science fiction novels or to the (now-de-
ceased) Star Trek TV series for support for their positions.44 
Twenty years after Sputnik (and twenty years after that), accordingly, it 
was not unusual to hear high NASA officials and space advocates enunciate 
grand visions of space exploration. America is a nation of explorers and fron-
tiers, the argument goes. Discovery is essential to national vigor, vitality, and 
survival. Nor was it unusual for these space advocates to believe NASA en-
joyed periods of uncomplicated and thorough public support during the first 
decade of the Space Age. Transcendent-transformative ideas that result often 
have a spiritual, even religious, overlay. To "understand popular attitudes to-
wards space," a panel of high-ranking NASA lab managers wrote in 1976, "[I]t 
is necessary to go far beyond explicit, rational calculations of profit and loss." 
The "most striking effects" of the Space Age, they continued "are likely to come 
in the [twenty-five] years just ahead, as humans who have lived entirely within 
the space age become adults." A Copernican, Galilean, or post-Christopher 
Columbus revolution in socio-economic, religious, and intellectual ideas and 
institutions so often and insistently hoped-for by space exploration advocates in 
the years immediately after Sputnik had not yet happened. But the transforma-
tive delay would only be temporary. A new millennium would see a new heaven 
and a new earth in the minds of humanity, and NASA would lead the way into 
that new era.45 
Thirty years further along, the millennium has come; but not for space ex-
ploration advocates. The planet most people care about most is clearly Earth. 
And earthly environmentalism, not space exploration, is the chief science-based 
political phenomenon of the age. NASA is honored and space is important for 
meteorology, climatology, communications, resources, intelligence, and mili-
tary command and control. But young people do not connect cell phones, glo-
bal warming debates, and live, satellite-based weather reports with NASA. This 
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is in large part because NASA long avoided key Earth-related research opportu-
nities, and so insured the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
the Energy Department, and others would be created to do what it would not in 
areas including climate research and the ozone layer.46 
Illusions and Realities 
Thus a contemporary NASA is long on goals, short on money and political 
constituencies outside of the aerospace sector, and facing more staffing cuts. 
This as the Space Age approaches the half-century mark and as pioneering NASA 
Mercury and Apollo spacecraft have been on display at the Smithsonian Na-
tional Air and Space Museum since it opened in 1976. None of this is an acci-
dent. Politics is largely priority-setting and public mobilization. Space 
exploration, as a scientific priority, has come off badly, as compared with alter-
nate basic or applied research uses, ever since the first popular and educated 
science professional preference polls were done by reputable organizations like 
the Institute of Social Research of the University of Michigan (in 1959) and the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (in 1964).47 
Reasons are not difficult to find. People wish to avoid illness or affliction. 
Physicians and hospitals are prominent features of daily life. Urban centers— 
including Cleveland, Ohio—are internationally-known for their medical treat-
ment facilities—such as those located in and around Glennan's Case Western 
Reserve University. From the 1950s to the present, medicine—powered by ad-
vances in molecular biology and genetic research—today's "genetic engineer-
ing"—have regularly trumped spacecraft to other planets. 
Cities like Cleveland, however, have airports too. Pilots and airplanes are 
as essential to relatively affluent citizens as physicians or hospitals. So are many 
other uses of aerospace. But, as the local history of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration laboratory adjoining Cleveland's airport since 1942 
demonstrates, NASA managers in Cleveland failed to follow-up on fine politi-
cal opportunities in the formative decades of the Space Age. They wanted money 
without much community involvement, outreach, or disturbance for NASA's 
first quarter-century. The results of this political lag at the grass roots of politics 
are with us still, as embodied history. Imagine a rocket or spacecraft experienc-
ing a political, social, or economic tweak early in its flight path; one that has a 
far larger effect on where the vessel ends-up, or how long it takes to get there. 
An initially small direction change has it flying over Europe, not Africa; a small 
difference in thrust causes a trip to take years longer, or even insures a destina-
tion can't be reached at all. At the grass roots in Cleveland, the proof for a 
Golden Age of popular support for space exploration is very slight. In part be-
cause NASA leaders did little with unusually advantageous local circumstances 
in the formative years of the Space Age. 
The past, however, is not a trap. In 1977, as we've seen, a young African-
American PhD from the University of Michigan received belated NASA sup-
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port to begin creating science and engineering career preparation programs in 
Cleveland's schools. By 1993, that same man, Dr. Julian Earls, played an im-
portant role in creating NASA's "Science, Engineering, Mathematics, and Aero-
space Academy" (or SEMAA) program, targeting groups like racial minorities 
and women long under-represented in science and technology fields. Beginning 
in Cleveland with 800 students per year, it has since expanded to a national 
organization serving 62,000 parents, students, and teachers at over twenty ma-
jor sites. Ten years later, Dr. Earls became the Director of the NASA Glenn 
Research Center at Lewis Field, serving until May of 2006. From belated and 
marginal beginnings, educational outreach had become a progressively more 
important factor in a NASA center's organizational existence in Cleveland, 
Ohio.48 
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